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Measuring Market Power in Professional Baseball, Basketball, Football and Hockey 
In 2015, the four largest professional sports leagues generated almost $28 billion in 
revenues with the NHL earning $4 billion, the NBA $4.8 billion, MLB $ 7.9 billion, and the NFL 
$11.1 billion.  While individual teams compete with one another in games, they cooperate with 
one another in the generation of sales.  All four leagues act as a single firm with the teams treated 
legally as if they were subsidiaries.  Because firms are not obligated to open subsidiaries, the 
leagues can legally restrict entry of new teams.  That differs from the European soccer leagues 
where the practice of relegation and promotion allow new teams to enter by winning their way 
into the top leagues.   
As monopolies, we would expect the North American professional leagues would price 
their product above marginal cost without risk of future lost profitability from new entry.  But do 
the ‘subsidiary’ individual teams have the same market power as the league or is their variation 
in market power across teams?  If a team’s ability to price is based on its local market, its success 
on the field, or the loyalty of its fan base, then there may be variation in market power across the 
teams.  On the other hand, if individual team profits are shared in common, as would be the case 
with pooled net revenues that were equally distributed across teams, the league market power 
would be the same as the individual team market power.  As a result, the team’s market power 
will be divorced from its local market conditions and past competitive success depending on the 
extent of revenue sharing in the league.  
 This study presents two variations on the Lerner Index computed from Forbes 
Magazine’s estimates of the revenues, costs and present values of U.S. professional sports teams.  
These price-cost margins are commonly used as indicators of the share of the consumer price 
that is the mark-up over cost.  Variation in these indexes across teams within a league will show 
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how much the league insulates member teams from their own local market conditions or their 
competitiveness.  Variation in price-cost margins across leagues will show which leagues have 
the greatest market power.  Variation across time will show how market power varies over the 
business cycle.   
 All four leagues are characterized by an ability to set price above marginal cost.  The 
stronger exemption from anti-trust laws in North America compared to European sports leagues 
are reflected in higher computed Lerner Indexes in all four leagues compared to comparable 
estimates for the most valuable European soccer teams.  All the North American leagues gained 
market power in the recovery, and common macroeconomic factors across teams are the 
dominant factor explaining variation in market power over the 2006-2016 sample period.  The 
highest price-cost margins are in the NBA and the NFL, the teams with the strongest revenue 
sharing policies.  Local market factors are more important for team market power in the NHL 
and MLB where revenue sharing is less aggressive. 
1.  Background  
 Professional sports leagues in the United States have market power because they can 
legally collude to limit entry.  As a result, they can set the number of games, control broadcasting, 
restrict ticket sales, and restrict sale of licensed memorabilia. However, Major League Baseball 
is the only league that has a nonstatutory exemption from the Sherman Anti-Trust Act thanks to a 
Supreme Court ruling that ruled baseball was not a business and therefore not subject to antitrust 
regulation (Federal Baseball Club vs. National League, 1922).  The antitrust exemption was 
upheld in Toolson vs. New York Yankees, Inc. (1953).  Because these rulings apply only to 
MLB, other professional leagues such as the NBA, NHL, and NFL are technically subject to 
antitrust law although there has been no definitive legal test. An argument favoring exemption 
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from antitrust law is that these leagues are viewed as single entities with subsidiaries rather than 
competing businesses.  As individual entities, the leagues are viewed as a single firm allocating 
production across its subsidiaries rather than as a group of colluding firms (Farzin, 2015).1 The 
anti-trust protection of the other leagues is sufficiently strong that Grow (2012) argues that even 
if the MLB exemption were to be reversed, its current practices are so similar to the other 
leagues that do not enjoy the added protection that monopoly power in MLB would be 
unaffected.2   
 Professional sports in the U.S. appear to have a stronger exemption from antitrust law 
than do professional leagues in Europe.  Sports Governing Bodies (“SGBs”) such as the British 
Premiership, the German Bundesliga, or the Italian Serie A administer rules that could violate 
European antitrust laws if the rules are believed to limit economic competition. However, the 
European Commission and the European Court of Justice have been willing to grant that 
professional sports leagues regulate competition among their members for noneconomic reasons 
(Farzin, 2015).  However, all of the European soccer leagues have rules that force teams to place 
high enough in the league standings to retain their status in the top league.  Teams that lose too 
many games are relegated to lower leagues while others are promoted from below.  As a result, 
professional teams in Europe have less security against competition than is the case in the United 
States.  These difference in rules regarding entry and exit may lower price-cost margins for 
European teams compared to teams in North America. 
                                                            
1 While three of the leagues also have teams in Canada, the Foreign Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 treats 
foreign firms as subject to U.S. antitrust laws, and so the Canadian teams can also be treated as subsidiaries. 
2 Some have argued that professional sports are a natural monopoly.  For example, Che and Humphreys (2015) 
found that the only stable equilibria in their game theoretic model of sports leagues ended up with a single league, 
whether because the incumbent league raised salaries sufficiently to limit entry or because they merge with the rival 
league.  However, this is not a natural monopoly but a monopoly that results from incentives in which the monopoly 
results from firm behavior.  As Noll (2003) argues, the existence of divisions within leagues suggests that the league 
is not a natural monopoly.  
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2.  Methodology 
 Abba Lerner (1934) showed that profit maximizing firms facing imperfect competition 
will set price such that  
(1)   ܮܫ ൌ 	 ௉ିெ஼௉ ൌ |
ଵ
ாವ |  
where the Lerner Index (LI) is shown to be the ratio of the difference between price (P) and 
marginal cost (MC) as a ratio of the price.  That ratio, in turn, is equal to the inverse of the 
absolute value of the elasticity of firm demand.  Without market power, P = MC,	ܧ஽ → െ∞,  
and so LI = 0.  The other extreme would have ܮܫ ൌ |ܧ஽| ൌ 1 as would be the case if the team 
acted as a pure monopolist with no substitutes for its product and a marginal cost of generating 
revenue of 0.  More generally, the elasticity of demand will be greater than 1 in absolute value as 
there are substitutes for the team’s services (competing entertainment events, other media 
offerings, alternative licensed clothing).  As a result, the team’s Lerner Index will be greater than 
0.  The greater the Lerner Index, the greater the market power.  
 In practice, it may be difficult to observe marginal cost.  However, if the production 
function is Cobb Douglas, marginal cost is proportional to average cost and so we may be able to 
approximate unobserved marginal costs with observed average costs, AC.  That is also 
appropriate if the average costs are constant over a range of output so that MC = AC.  In either 
case, equation (1) may be approximated by  
(2)   ܮܫ ൌ 	 ௉ି஺஼௉ ൌ
ିଵ
ாವ  
 The difficulty with applying equation (2) to measure market power of professional sports 
teams is that we do not observe quantity or price.  Professional sports teams are multiproduct 
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firms producing a myriad of products including tickets, media access, memorabilia, and 
advertising.  Developing a market power measure will require aggregating across all of these 
products.   
 Information provided by Forbes Magazine allows us to finesse this complication.  Forbes 
has been providing annual estimates of the present value, operating revenues and total revenues 
of professional sports franchises.  We can write the Forbes estimate of total revenue for team j in 
league k and year t as 
(3A)   ܶ ௝ܴ௞௧ ൌ ௝ܲ௞௧ ∙ ݍ௝௞௧ ,  
where ௝ܲ௞௧ is the unobserved price and ݍ௝௞௧ is the unobserved quantity produced by that team.  
Forbes also reports the ‘current value’ of the franchise.  We interpret that measure to be the 
present value of owning the stream of net earnings generated by the team:  
(3B)  ܲ ௝ܸ௞௧ ൌ 	 ௉ೕೖ೟∙௤ೕೖ೟ି஺஼ೕೖ೟∙௤ೕೖ೟௜     
under the assumption that the current net earnings for year t are expected to continue in 
perpetuity.  In 3B),  ܣܥ௝௞௧ is the average cost of providing sports services and i is the interest rate.   
 Forbes also reports operating revenue, which can be viewed as current year profit defined 
by  
(3C)  ߨ௝௞௧ ൌ ௝ܲ௞௧ ∙ ݍ௝௞௧ െ ܣܥ௝௞௧ ∙ ݍ௝௞௧ 
The Forbes financial estimates provide two ways to approximate the Lerner Index for each 
franchise in each year.  The first variation uses (3A) and (3B).  Multiply both sides of (3B) by an 
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estimate of the interest rate to get  ݅ ∙ ܲ ௝ܸ௞௧ ൌ 	 ௝ܲ௞௧ ∙ ݍ௝௞௧ െ ܣܥ௝௞௧ ∙ ݍ௝௞௧.  Then divide both sides 
by (3A) to get a long-run measure of the price-cost margin for team j3  
(4A)  ܮܫ௝௞௧௅ோ ൌ ݅ ∙ ሺ ௉௏ೕೖ೟௉ೕೖ೟∙௤ೕೖ೟ሻ ൌ 	
௉ೕೖ೟∙௤ೕೖ೟ି஺஼ೕೖ೟∙௤ೕೖ೟
௉ೕೖ೟∙௤ೕೖ೟ ൌ 	
௉ೕೖ೟ି஺஼ೕೖ೟
௉ೕೖ೟  .   
In other words, we multiply an estimate of the interest rate to the ratio of the Forbes estimate of 
current franchise value relative to its current total revenue to generate an estimate of the Lerner 
Index.  Because this measure incorporates the stream of future profits of the franchise, we view it 
as the long-run measure of the Lerner Index.  This variation of the Lerner index can be estimated 
despite not observing either the team’s price or quantity. 
The second variation divides (3C) by (3A) to get4   
(4B)   ܮܫ௝௞௧ௌோ ൌ గೕೖ೟௉ೕೖ೟∙௤ೕೖ೟ ൌ 	
௉ೕೖ೟∙௤ೕೖ೟ି஺஼ೕೖ೟∙௤ೕೖ೟
௉ೕೖ೟∙௤ೕೖ೟ 	ൌ 	
௉ೕೖ೟ି஺஼ೕೖ೟
௉ೕೖ೟   
This measure approximates the Lerner index by the ration of the team’s operating revenue 
relative to its total revenue.  Again, we are able to approximate the Lerner Index without 
separately observing either output or price.   This measure relies only on the short-term gross and 
operating revenues for the team, and so we view it as a short-run estimate of the Lerner Index. 
These two measures may differ from one another depending on how Forbes measures the 
present value of the team versus the team’s operating income.  The long-run measure will be 
more forward looking, incorporating future anticipated streams of revenue or future growth of 
                                                            
3 Vrooman (2009), table 1, computes average values of the ratio of team value to revenue for the NFL, NBA, NHL, 
and MLB using Forbes 2006 data.  His measure is ൬ ௉௏ೕೖ೟௉ೕೖ೟∙௤ೕೖ೟൰ in 4A) which he calls the league’s ‘risk adjusted 
revenue multiple’.  Although he makes reference to presumed demand elasticities for the sport in explaining 
variation in the value of the revenue multiple across leagues, he does not use the value explicitly as a measure of 
market power.  
4 Brook and Fenn used this measure in testing for the existence of market power in the NFL from 1995 to 1999.  
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demand for the team’s services which may not yet be captured by current revenue.  The short-
term measure will only reflect current revenue streams.   
In addition, the Forbes measures are all estimates based on projections rather than direct 
access to firm financial information.  The projections are based on various sources of 
information including revenue sharing provisions, purchase offers, arena contracts, media 
experts, and team provided information such as attendance, ticket sales, and salaries.  As such, 
the Forbes data and hence our own measures will be subject to unknown errors.  Nevertheless, 
both measures should respond to sources of shifting demand for the team’s services.  We can 
make an educated guess regarding their relative reliability by the extent to which they respond 
plausibly to demand shifts.     
3.  Revenue Sharing 
Revenue sharing will lower the team’s dependence on its own market. Instead, the team’s 
market power will now reflect the extent to which the team’s revenue depends on shared rents 
across all teams versus its own efforts. In the limit, if all revenues and costs are equally shared by 
the league, there would be no variation in market power across teams. Instead, the Lerner Index 
would be identical across all teams. Consequently, an indicator of the strength of the league’s 
revenue sharing agreement will be if a team’s market power is independent of its local market or 
past competitive success. Evidence supporting that conjecture was presented by Berri, Leeds, 
and von Allmen (2015) who showed that team performance was only weakly tied to team 
revenues. Winning 10% more games led to only 2.7% more revenue in baseball and basketball 
and less than 1% in football.  Profit maximizing teams will lower salaries if the link between 
player salary and profit decreases, and as a result, profits for the league as a while rise.  
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However, as Vrooman (2000, 2009) explains, revenue sharing can lead to higher profit overall if team 
owners want to maximize profit and not won-loss record. 
While all leagues use revenue sharing, the details differ.  In the NFL, gate receipts are 
split 60% to the local team and 40% shared. Licensed deals (such as merchandizes & jerseys) 
and TV revenue are shared equally among all teams (Berri, 2015).  There is less revenue sharing 
in the MLB. In the 2012-2016 Basic Agreement between the 30 Major League Clubs and the 
Major League Baseball Players Association (MLB, 2012), teams send 34% of each team’s net 
revenue to the league, and these proceeds are shared equally among the teams. That means that 
higher earning clubs subsidize the lower earning clubs.   
Perhaps the most aggressive revenue sharing plan is the one initiated by the NBA starting 
with the 2013-14 season. The plan calls for all teams to contribute roughly 50 percent of their 
annual revenue after expenses into a pool. Each team then receives an allocation equal to the 
league’s average team payroll for that season from the revenue pool (Lombardo, 2012).   
Hockey has the least aggressive revenue sharing program. As laid out in the NHL (2012) 
collective bargaining agreement, the Redistribution Commitment is only 6.055% of the league-
wide hockey revenues. The richest 10 teams contribute 50% of the total based on the gap 
between their revenues and the revenues of the 11th richest team. Added to this is 35% of the gate 
revenue from the Stanley Cup Playoffs.  These funds are then reallocated with the poorest teams 
getting the largest shares from the shared pool. 
  Evaluating the relative degree of redistribution, clearly the NHL has is the least 
redistributive and the NBA and the NFL are the most redistributive.  As the degree of 
redistribution through revenue sharing increases, the team’s dependence on its own revenues 
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diminishes.  Consequently, we would expect that team market power would be most tied to the 
local market conditions and team performance in the NHL.  In the NBA and the NFL, the team’s 
market power will be tied more to the league market power rather than local market conditions.   
4. Data 
Lerner Indexes 
 We use the Forbes estimates of MLB, NBA, NFL and NHL team revenues, costs and 
present values from 2006 through 2016.  The MLB has 30 teams, the NBA has 30 teams, the 
NFL has 32 teams, and the NHL has 30 teams.  Consequently, our data set includes 330 
observations from baseball, basketball, and hockey and 352 observations from football.   Our 
long-run measure, ܮܫ௝௞௧௅ோ , defined by equation (4A), multiplies an assumed interest rate of 0.03 
times the ratio of the Forbes estimate of the team’s total revenue relative to its current value.  
Our findings are not sensitive to the choice of alternative interest rates. Our short-run measure, 
ܮܫ௝௞௧ௌோ ,  defined equation (4B), is the ratio of the Forbes estimates of operating revenue relative to 
total revenue. 
 Appendix Table 1 presents averages of the two computed Lerner indexes for each team in 
the 4 North American professional sports leagues.  The long-run measures have the advantage 
that they are always positive and consistent with the theoretical assumption of profit 
maximization used to derive the Lerner Index.  The short-run measures generate negative values 
for some years, and are negative on average for some teams over the 11-year period.  Only the 
NFL has positive averages for all teams.  In the NFL, the short- and long-run measures are 
correlated at 0.56.  The leagues whose teams have negative values also have smaller or even 
negative correlations between the two measures.  We presume the long-run measures are more 
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accurate both because they are consistent with the theoretical requirements and because it is 
likely that the Forbes estimate for the sales value of the team is more accurate than the Forbes 
estimate of annual team cost of operation. For that reason, we only use the long-run measures for 
our remaining analysis. 
 To illustrate the relative market power of the various professional leagues, Figure 1 
presents the cumulative distribution of our long-run Lerner Indexes for the four North American 
Sports Leagues.  We include estimates based on Forbes estimated valuations and revenues for 
the 30 most successful European soccer teams.  All estimates are for 2015, the latest year for 
which we had consistent data for Europe and North America.  The highest price cost margins are 
found in the NBA and the NFL, the leagues with the most aggressive revenue sharing systems. 
The NHL, the North American league with the least egalitarian redistribution policy, has the 
lowest price cost margins. But all four North American leagues have price-cost margin 
distributions that lie to the right of the European teams.   
The higher price-cost margins for the MLB, NBA, NFL, and NHL are consistent with 
their presumed greater protection against antitrust laws.  North American teams are protected 
from new entrants and do not face the possibility of forced exit through relegation.    The 
relationship between revenue sharing and market power is not as clear.  It is possible that more 
profitable leagues adopt more egalitarian tax and transfer systems.  It is worth noting that the less 
profitable European leagues have also not used revenue sharing beyond sharing television 
revenues, perhaps an added reason for their lower price-cost margins.5   
                                                            
5 Even the television revenues are not evenly split.  For example, the Premiership divides 50% of television revenues 
equally, but the rest are distributed based on won-loss record and facility fees. 
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Figures 2 through 5 show how the cumulative distribution of team long-run market power 
changes over time.  We present the distributions for 2006, 2011 and 2016.  Only the NFL had a 
decline in market power during the Great Recession, albeit from enviably high price-cost 
margins.  The other three leagues maintained market power between 2006 and 2011.  The 
recovery period has been accompanied by strong growth in long-run market power for all 4 
leagues. 
Explanatory Variables 
 We selected variables that were commonly used to explain variation in team value in 
prior studies.6  Table 1 presents the summary statistics for the city and team factors we use to 
explain variation in the Lerner Indexes.  We have four categories of factors, team tradition, 
recent competitive success, business cycle, and local market conditions.  Our aim is to assess the 
relative importance of these factors in shaping a team’s market power and to examine their 
relative importance under more or less egalitarian redistribution policies.  
 Team tradition is measured by the year the team was founded, the number of 
championships, the number of championship final appearances, and the ratio of championship 
wins to appearances.  Recent team success is measured by the prior season’s won-loss 
percentage.7  All these data were compiled from available on-line league records. 
 Both macroeconomic shocks the local economic climate are likely to affect team 
profitability.  We control for macroeconomic shocks using annual dummy variables.  The time 
period covered includes the Great Recession which should illustrate how each league fares in 
contractions and expansions.   
                                                            
6 Scelles et al (2016) provide a review of 7 studies in addition to their own.  
7 We remove ties from the won-loss computation.  Ties do not occur in baseball or basketball and are rare in football 
and hockey.  Preliminary analysis that added a measure for ties did not affect the results. 
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Our local market conditions are measured by the metropolitan areas population and real per 
capita income.  We include a dummy variable for Canadian teams to correct for differences in 
currency valuations.  For U.S. cities, the population and per capita income measures come from 
the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.  The Canadian data were obtained 
from Statistics Canada.  
5.  Results 
Table 2 reports the results of regressions explaining variation in the long-run measures of 
the Lerner Index.  The most interesting simply perform the analysis of variation between 
common macroeconomic shocks, fixed team effects, and unobserved factors specific to the team.  
Across all 4 leagues, the dominant factor explaining variation in market power are time-varying 
macroeconomic factors common to all teams in the league.  These factors would include the 
performance of the U.S. economy as a whole.  As household incomes have risen with the 
recovery, all teams would have benefited from increased ticket sales, greater demand for sports 
merchandise, and greater advertising revenue.  Compared to the prerecession levels in 2006, 
price-cost margins had risen by 4.5 percentage points in the NFL, 6.3 percentage points in MLB, 
and 10.5 percentage points in the NBA.  In the NHL, price-cost margins were still at their 2006 
levels as of 2016.   
However, another source of common market power is the league itself which protects all 
teams from competition.  The common shocks explain 74% of the variation in the NBA, the 
league with the most aggressive revenue sharing.  It explains only 54% of the variation in the 
NHL, the league with the least aggressive redistribution policy.8  Individual team effects explain 
                                                            
8 Vrooman (2000, 2009) argues that revenue sharing could increase or decrease team profitability.  If team owners 
are profit maximizers, revenue sharing will not change competitive balance but it will lower the value of winning 
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only 9% of the variation in market power across teams in the NBA, but 22% in the NHL and 31% 
in MLB.  This suggests that the disadvantage of a small or unsupportive local market is most 
apparent in baseball and least apparent in the NBA.   
The fourth columns in Table 2 attempt to identify the source of local team market power.  
We divide the factors into long-run team performance, recent won loss record, and the strength 
of the municipal economic environment.  Surprisingly, team long- and short-run performance has 
a significant effect on price cost margins only in the NBA and (marginally) in MLB.   In 
those leagues, teams with more championships have greater market power.  But in the NFL and 
the NHL, team success does not affect market power.  In addition, local market conditions do not 
shape market power in the NHL and the NFL although they do in the NBA and MLB.  
Examining the relative magnitude of the R2 in columns 3 and 4 show that much of the team share 
of the variation in long-run market power is due to factors unrelated to the measures of team 
performance and local market conditions included in Table 2. 
It may seem strange that so little of the variation in firm market power is explained by the 
strength of the local market or past team wins and losses when these variables were so important 
in explaining the value of European soccer teams (Scelles et al, 2016)) or North American 
professional team’s values (Alexander and Kern, 2004; Scelles et al, 2013).   The present value 
of the team does not imply market power.  For example, teams in small market may have lower 
value and still have market power to price above marginal cost in their limited market.  As 
another example, Alexander (2001) found that baseball teams set ticket prices at levels consistent 
with monopoly pricing, and yet the team ticket demand elasticities differed significantly across 
teams.  Some of the small market teams (Cincinnati, Kansas City, Milwaukee, Minnesota) had 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
which will lower salaries and raise profits.  If team owners are win maximizers, they will bid up the value of players 
which will lower profitability, even as the policy increases competitive balance. 
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relatively few substitutes for the entertainment dollar and so they had small demand elasticities 
thus the greatest implied market power on ticket sales despite having relatively low team value.9  
Meanwhile, high value teams such as the Dodgers, Cubs and Red Sox had much more elastic 
demand for their tickets because there were so many other entertainment substitutes. 
6.  Conclusion 
 North American professional sports leagues enjoy stronger exemptions from anti-trust 
legislation than is true in Europe.  Using estimates provided by Forbes magazine, we generate 
measures of price-cost margins over the 2006-2016 period to examine the relative market power 
for the various leagues and how the market power varies over time.  North American teams have 
more market power than European teams.  Market power in North America is attributable more 
to common factors affecting all teams within a league and less to individual team athletic success 
or the size of the local market.  The more aggressive is revenue sharing across teams, the less 
important is the local market and the more important is the league to the team’s market power. In 
addition, leagues with stronger revenue sharing have higher price-cost margins.    
 
  
                                                            
9 Recall that the Lerner index is inversely proportional to the absolute value of the elasticity of demand, ܮܫ ൌ 	 ିଵாವ. 
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Figure 1: Cumulative Distributions of Long-Run Price Cost Margins for 5 Professional Sports, 2016 
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Figure 2: Cumulative Distributions of Long-Run Price Cost Margins for Major League Baseball, 2006, 2011, 2016 
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Figure 3: Cumulative Distributions of Long-Run Price Cost Margins for the National Basketball Association, 2006, 2011, 2016 
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Figure 4: Cumulative Distributions of Long-Run Price Cost Margins for the National Football League, 2006, 2011, 2016 
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Figure 5: Cumulative Distributions of Long-Run Price Cost Margins for the National Hockey League, 2006, 2011, 2016 
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Table 1 Summary Statistics  
Team MLB NBA NFL NHL 
ܮܫ௝௞௧௅ோ 	 Lerner Index 
using present value 
0.09 0.13 0.14 0.08 
(0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) 
Long Run     
Total championships 3.77 2.30 1.59 3.07 (5.22) (4.11) (1.84) (5.05) 
Total appearances in 
championship final 
7.47 4.57 3.19 6.13 
(8.31) (6.44) (2.56) (8.12) 
Year founded         
Short Run     
Winning percentage 
previous season 
0.50 0.50 0.50 0.48 
(0.67) (0.16) (0.20) (0.11) 
Metro Market     
Population (log) 15.36 15.15 15.05 15.12 (0.65) (0.80) (0.83) (0.91) 
Income per capita (log) 10.78 10.73 10.74 10.87 (0.19) (0.20) (0.17) (0.27) 
N 330 330 352 330 
years 2006 - 2016 2006 - 2016 2006 - 2016 2006 - 2016 
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Notes: Dependent variable multiplied by 100 to scale the parameters.   
All estimation corrected for clustering at the individual team level.  t-statistics reported in parentheses.  
 * significance at the 0.1 level.  ** significance at the 0.05 level. 
 
Table 2 Regression explaining Variation in  Long-Run Price Cost Margins, by North American Professional League, 2006-2016.  
Team MLB NBA NFL NHL 
Long Run              
Total championships 
   0.20    0.29**    0.10    0.04 
   (1.17)    (2.47)    (0.43)    (0.28) 
Total appearances in 
championship final 
   0.07    0.10    -0.01    -0.02 
   (0.58)    (1.14)    (0.10)    (0.19) 
Year founded 
   0.002    0.003    -0.008    0.006 
   (0.43)    (0.22)    (1.09)    (0.26) 
Short Run                 
Winning percentage previous 
season 
   -0.67    1.61    -0.02    0.17 
   (0.71)    (1.10)    (0.03)    (0.16) 
Metro Market                 
Population (log) 
   1.65**    1.23**    0.21    -0.24 
   (3.80)    (3.38)    (0.76)    (0.82) 
Income per capita (log) 
   0.38    1.00    1.23    -0.05 
   (0.30)    (0.59)    (0.77)    (0.06) 
Year Effects  √  √ √ √  √ √ √  √ √ √  √ √ 
Team Effects  √ √   √ √   √ √   √ √  
R2 .57 .31 .88 .76 .74 .09 .84 .80 .61 .18 .80 .65 .54 .22 .76 .55 
N 330 330 330 330 330 330 330 330 352 352 352 352 330 330 330 330 
Test of long and short run team 
performance 
F(4, T-4) T= # of teams 
   2.64*    8.03**    0.57    0.13 
Test of Metro Market variables 
F(2, T-2), T = # of teams    8.33*    10.31**    1.17    0.44 
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Team Long‐run Short‐run Team Long‐run Short‐run
NY Yankees 0.138 -0.023 LA Clippers 0.168 0.177
LA Dodgers 0.134 0.016 Boston 0.162 0.296
Boston 0.114 0.057 Golden State 0.162 0.096
San Francisco 0.112 0.114 LA Lakers 0.154 0.252
Chicago Cubs 0.11 0.116 NY Knicks 0.151 0.183
NY Mets 0.093 0.036 Brooklyn 0.146 -0.124
St. Louis 0.092 0.118 Chicago 0.144 0.172
Anaheim 0.092 0.039 Dallas 0.137 0.036
Washington 0.09 0.162 Portland 0.129 0.058
Philadelphia 0.089 0.008 Miami 0.127 0.481
Texas 0.087 0.052 Houston 0.127 0.22
Seattle 0.087 0.054 Orlando 0.124 0.035
Atlanta 0.087 0.097 Cleveland 0.123 0.474
Detroit 0.086 -0.029 Toronto 0.123 0.172
Houston 0.086 0.136 Sacramento 0.123 0.049
Chi. White Sox 0.085 0.101 Oklahoma City 0.12 0.102
Baltimore 0.084 0.1 Memphis 0.119 0.026
Pittsburgh 0.081 0.141 Washington 0.119 -0.018
Arizona 0.08 0.046 Detroit 0.118 0.031
Minnesota 0.079 0.111 Atlanta 0.118 0.004
Cincinnati 0.078 0.083 Utah 0.117 0.083
Toronto 0.078 0.033 Phoenix 0.115 0.158
San Diego 0.077 0.143 Indiana 0.113 0.013
Milwaukee 0.076 0.089 Charlotte 0.113 -0.053
Kansas City 0.076 0.089 Minnesota 0.112 0.034
Colorado 0.075 0.098 San Antonio 0.111 0.099
Cleveland 0.075 0.109 Philadelphia 0.11 -0.042
Oakland 0.074 0.13 Denver 0.108 0.156
Miami 0.071 0.131 Milwaukee 0.108 0.001
Tampa Bay 0.071 0.114 New Orleans 0.105 0.069
Average 0.089 0.082 0.127 0.108
MLB NBA
Appendix Table 1 Average Price Cost Margin for Each Professional Sports 
Team from 2006 - 2016
 
Notes: Long-run measures are computed using equation 4A),  ܮܫ௝௞௧௅ோ ൌ ݅ ∙ ሺ ௉௏ೕೖ೟௉ೕೖ೟∙௤ೕೖ೟ሻ . 
Short –run Measures are computed using equation 4B), ܮܫ௝௞௧ௌோ ൌ గೕೖ೟௉ೕೖ೟∙௤ೕೖ೟ . 
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Team Long‐run Short‐run Team Long‐run Short‐run
NY Giants 0.161 0.167 Anaheim 0.232 0.06
Dallas 0.155 0.289 Winnipeg 0.215 0.044
NY Jets 0.155 0.156 Columbus 0.18 -0.032
Washington 0.151 0.269 Philadelphia 0.147 0.162
New England 0.15 0.256 Carolina 0.146 -0.05
Chicago 0.149 0.2 Pittsburgh 0.135 0.077
Houston 0.148 0.215 Toronto 0.127 0.53
Indianapolis 0.147 0.168 San Jose 0.125 0.13
San Francisco 0.147 0.112 Detroit 0.111 0.173
Philadelphia 0.146 0.18 Washington 0.103 -0.008
Miami 0.145 0.089 NY Islanders 0.102 -0.018
Baltimore 0.142 0.152 Edmonton 0.098 0.089
Denver 0.141 0.132 Calgary 0.094 0.032
Green Bay 0.141 0.124 Arizona 0.086 -0.097
Pittsburgh 0.14 0.108 Buffalo 0.082 -0.043
Seattle 0.138 0.07 Boston 0.077 0.144
Kansas City 0.136 0.136 St. Louis 0.074 -0.039
Los Angeles 0.136 0.114 Nashville 0.073 -0.031
Minnesota 0.136 0.063 Dallas 0.066 -0.005
Tampa Bay 0.135 0.192 Ottawa 0.066 -0.075
Carolina 0.135 0.112 Colorado 0.064 -0.015
Tennessee 0.133 0.143 Tampa Bay 0.064 -0.015
Cleveland 0.132 0.11 New Jersey 0.062 -0.016
Arizona 0.131 0.13 Minnesota 0.062 -0.029
San Diego 0.129 0.138 Montreal 0.059 0.56
Cincinnati 0.129 0.135 NY Rangers 0.054 0.441
Atlanta 0.129 0.095 Chicago 0.053 0.208
Oakland 0.127 0.091 Florida 0.048 -0.06
Detroit 0.127 0.03 Vancouver 0.042 0.072
New Orleans 0.126 0.13 Los Angeles 0.031 0.062
Jacksonville 0.119 0.149    
Buffalo 0.119 0.132    
0.139 0.144 0.096 0.075
NFL NHL
Appendix Table 1 Average Price Cost Margin for Each Professional 
Sports Team from 2006 - 2016 (continued)
 
Notes: Long-run measures are computed using equation 4A),  ܮܫ௝௞௧௅ோ ൌ ݅ ∙ ሺ ௉௏ೕೖ೟௉ೕೖ೟∙௤ೕೖ೟ሻ . 
Short –run Measures are computed using equation 4B), ܮܫ௝௞௧ௌோ ൌ గೕೖ೟௉ೕೖ೟∙௤ೕೖ೟ . 
